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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. European policies
The European Union has committed itself to increase the share of renewable energy up to 20% 
of the final consumption by 2020, from 9.2% in 2006 (EC 2009). The same political wave is 
mounting in several other countries, most notably the United States. The feeling that renew-
able energy sources (RES) should cover a higher share of energy production relies on two ma-
jor arguments: (a) it is assumed that reliance on fossil fuels should be reduced, both for the 
sake of energy security and for climate-related reasons; and (b) investing in RES will spur 
economic growth and, in the post-recession world, will enhance economic recovery. The goal 
of this paper is to deal with (b). As to (a), we will just raise two issues.
The questions are the following:
• Assuming that we should reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions by a given amount 
(as to Europe, GHGs should be reduced by 20% below 1990 levels by 2020), is it correct 
to define a specific target for RES?
• How does this interact with the existing policies?
Even these questions shall not be answered in this paper. It is however important to empha-
size that what we consider as a given—the need to achieve 20% RES—is actually matter of a 
heated debate. So, whatever conclusion we reach, our arguments will not be enough to de-
fine a proper environmental policy, under the assumption that the ultimate environmental 
target is GHGs abatement, regardless to the policy tools and the technologies employed. One 
non-negligible fact, indeed, is that emphasis on RES risks sometimes to distract attention 
from other technologies and policies that, in principle, might be adopted to meet the same 
goal of curbing emissions. 
A second issue is related to the European choice of setting three parallel goals—less emis-
sions, more RES, and more energy efficiency (although the latter is a non-binding goal under 
the climate package). Each goal is somehow related with the others, as are the policy instru-
ments which have been selected. As a result, it may happen that either some goals (or in-
struments) are negatively correlated (such as, in the short run, the idea that investments in 
new capacity are needed, while consumption is to be cut) or originate inefficiencies (as is the 
case with a multiple certificate system—see Bye and Bruvoll 2008).
1.2. The purpose of the paper
The purpose of this paper is narrower in scope. We are just trying to answer the question 
whether or not the “double dividend” theory—that states that investing in RES is beneficial 
both for  the environment and for the economy—resists to empirical scrutiny. We will assume 
that there is an environmental benefit, from investing in RES, although we shall not try to 
measure it, nor shall we rely on previous studies. Hence, we will focus on the economics of 
RES, trying to develop a model to perform a cost-benefit analysis. The analysis will also ig-
nore other non-economic benefits from RES—such as their alleged health and security bene-
fits—so it is deliberately partial. Yet, we believe a fundamental piece of information is lack-
ing, with regard to pro-RES policies. Europeans and others are investing massively in the 
green sector, and a massive flow of incentives is moving from the society to green produc-
ers—either as public subsidies, or  as feed-in tariffs, or as mandates,1 or some mixtures of the 
above—and the society has a right to know whether this serves to create wealth as well as 
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1 Mandates are not, strictly speaking, the same as subsidies, but in the end of the day they determine 
the same results of shifting resources by altering the supply function through an additional constraint, 
rather than the demand function through a price increase. On the equivalence of taxation and regula-
tion, see Posner 1971).
achieving some environmental goal, or wealth is actually destroyed to pursue non-economic 
benefits, however valuable.
To the ends of this paper, and for  the sake of simplicity, we will focus on just two RES—wind 
power and solar  photovoltaic power—both of which are employed for electricity generation. 
We will ignore other RES (hydro power, geothermic power, biofuels, etc.) as well as incentives 
to energy efficiency and other policy instruments. For the sake of simplicity, from hereby on, 
“RES” will mean just wind & photovoltaic power, unless differently specified.
Section 2 will illustrate three supposedly successful experiences with RES: Denmark, Ger-
many, and Spain. The German case is particularly interesting, as it is most often indicated as 
a model of creating wealth through subsidizing RES. In fact, Germany made RES a pillar of its 
industrial policies, and succeeded in creating a strong industry which is today among world 
leaders in the green sector. It is often cited the number of people employed in the sec-
tor—240,000 as of 2009—but it is hard to tell whether the net impact, both on GDP and em-
ployment, has been positive. A broader overview of pro-RES policies in the EU member states 
has been performed by Nomisma Energia (NE 2007).
Section 3 will focus on the Italian energy market, by illustrating its functioning as well as the 
various attempts that have been done over time to support RES. Italy is quite a peculiar mar-
ket, and paradoxically it ensembles among the highest incentives in the World with a 
medium-to-low rate of investments. One reason for this may be the opacities in the licensing 
processes, which determine high development costs and place a higher-than-normal premium 
on bureaucratic and political risk. At the same time, Italy can leverage upon a relatively high 
share of RES, which it  inherited from the massive investments that were done in hydropower 
during the XIX and the first half of XX century (Zorzoli 2009).
Section 4 will review the different subsidy schemes that have been in function. 
Section 5 will review the existing estimates on green jobs in Italy. Even here, data are poor 
and present a wide range of variability. The analysis of the available data will allow us to pick 
an “optimistic” and a “pessimistic” scenario. It should be emphasized that we feel like both 
scenarios tend to overestimate the actual number of green jobs. Yet we assume they may 
represent an acceptable basis to estimate future jobs. 
Section 6 will assess the cost of subsidies to renewables in the past few years in Italy. The ex-
istence of different subsidy scheme, as well as the lack of full transparency over the amount 
of resources that have been devoted to spur RES, have made this effort particularly signifi-
cant.
Section 7 will estimate the number of future green jobs that will be created, under an opti-
mistic and a pessimistic scenario, and under the assumptions that (a) Italy will reach by 2020 
its “maximum potential” for RES (wind and PV) as defined by the Italian government in 2007, 
and (b) the average subsidy per unit of renewable capacity will remain the same for all the 
period between now and the time the subsidies will expire. All of our assumptions are aimed 
at overestimating the number of jobs. In this section we will also evaluate the stock of capital 
per worker in the RES industry, as compared with the same figure for the industrial sector and 
the economy as a whole, in order to assess whether resources invested in the RES are more or 
less apt to create jobs.
Section 8 will conclude.
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2. THE HISTORY OF THREE COUNTRIES: DENMARK, GERMANY, AND SPAIN
2.1. The importance of being small: the case of Denmark
Following the oil shocks of the ‘70s, Denmark, a small, rich country of 5.5mln people, imple-
mented a radical shift in its energy policy: from being oil-based to becoming a leading coun-
try in RES. Through indirect subsidies, particularly premium rates to wind turbine owners and 
government support for R&D, RES energy grew rapidly. As for 2009, wind energy accounts for 
almost 19% of Danish power generation, with 3.160 MW installed, 70% of which in West Den-
mark, or 24% of total installed capacity (Danish Energy Agency, 2009). However, that doesn’t 
necessarily mean that 19% of the Danish electricity demand is met by wind power. In fact, a 
modern electricity system must insure that electricity demand and supply are perfectly bal-
anced at any given point in time: if that doesn’t happen, the system fails. Normally, Transmis-
sion System Operators (TSOs) are able to estimate very accurately demand and supply and 
can call upon power generators to reduce/increase production, according to the situation. 
Balancing reserves are available but can account for just a small share, as storing electricity 
is, at the present state of technology, very costly. Thus, most of the burden falls upon TSO’s 
forecast ability. With traditional energy sources (such as thermal, hydro, and nuclear power) 
that can be achieved because power plants are able to provide any amount x of energy (up to 
a maximum) whenever it is needed: as you push the button to start your dish-washer, a power 
plant somewhere is entering in function immediately to cover the excess demand (as com-
pared with the earlier). RES, particularly wind and solar power, are much different, and not 
just because the average capacity of power plant is much smaller (with the notable exception 
of the Roscoe Wind Farm in Texas, with 781,5 MW installed, wind farms usually average 100 
MW installed onshore, EON 2009), as compared with traditional power that are usually larger 
in size, (and may be as large as 8212 MW installed as for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear 
power plant, JNES 2009). More importantly, you can’t decide when, and how much energy is 
produced. Wind turbines will generate electricity only when the wind blows, according to the 
wind speed and direction; photovoltaic panels will generate power only when the sun shines 
and the sky is little cloudy. Power generation with RES is intermittent and unforeseeable—it is 
governed by stochastic, rather than deterministic, laws—which makes it particularly difficult 
to manage within a traditional grid, which was, and is, conceived as to manage a relatively 
small number of large generators, that can be easily driven. Stochastic power sources are es-
pecially challenging as the power demand changes in the short run, i.e. within minutes or 
hours. To keep the electricity systems balanced, TSOs need to access to significant amount of 
fast, short term balancing power. By chance, Denmark, a small country well interconnected 
with Germany and the Netherlands (UCTE grid) and with Norway and Sweden (NORDTEL grid), 
is surrounded by large and natural electricity storages, its neighboring countries, which act as 
“Danish electricity batteries”: when “excess” wind energy is produced, it flows towards Nor-
way and Sweden where large hydro plants can be switched off, effectively “storing” Danish 
wind power. In dry years, as little as 4% of Danish energy is consumed in Denmark while, on 
average, 57% of the produced wind energy in West Denmark (45% of East Denmark) is simulta-
neously exported. Ironically, notwithstanding its large investments in RES, Danes keep on con-
suming fossil energy (either from their Combined Heat and Power—CHP—plants or from Ger-
man imports). Moreover, the exported wind, which is cheap for the final consumers because it 
is subsidized by Danish taxpayers, flows towards Norway and Sweden, which can postpone 
further investments in RES energy, at Danes’ expenses. The relative success of the Danish sys-
tem, hence, should be understood as a consequence of the country’s peculiarities (windy cli-
mate and larger electricity pools where the excess generation can be stored), rather than an 
exportable model.
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Figure 1—Total employment in the Danish wind sector (Source: Sharman and Meyer 2009)
As to the employment situation, Sharman and Meyer (2009) state that 28,400 people are cur-
rently involved in the wind sector in Denmark, 55% of which working in the manufacturing of 
wind turbines—i.e. the number of employed persons depends critically on the future demand 
for assets, rather than on current demand for energy. Two Danish-based companies, Vestas 
and Siemens Wind division, account together for  more than 27% of the global market for wind 
turbines, making Danish wind industry a mostly export-oriented industry. Green jobs have 
grown constantly and quickly (figure 1) but the authors point out that per capita value-added, 
a measure of the income received by the factor, of the wind sector underperformed by 13% on 
average between 1999-2006, as compared to the broader manufacturing sector. According to 
Sharman and Meyer’s estimates, this corresponds to the manufacturing industry delivering on 
average 10,000$ per worker above the wind sector, with a gross subsidy between 9000$ and 
14000$ per worker per year.
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Figure 2 – German Energy Mix in 2000 and 2008 (Source: Frondel, Ritter and Vance 2009)
2.2. Green is not enough: Germany
Germany is widely regarded as one of the “greenest” countries in the world (figure 2), with 
more than 15% of the total electricity production from RES, twice as much as in 2000. Second 
only to the United States for the installed wind capacity, and well ahead Spain for photovol-
taic (PV) despite its suboptimal exposure to the Sun, Germany is today considered as a “shin-
ing example in providing a harvest for the world” (The Guardian, 23rd July 2007). This has 
been made possible by massive investments in RES since 1990, when the Electricity Feed-in 
Law (Stromeinspeisungsgesetz) entered into force. In 2002 a new law was passed, the Renew-
able Energy SourceAct (EGG—Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz), which guarantees support for 20 
years. The new feed-in tariffs range from 43.01 c€ per kWh for PV to 9.2 c€ per kWh for on 
shore wind and 15 c€ per kWh for offshore wind. Frondel, Ritter and Vance (2009) calculate a 
total subsidies to be as high as €35bn for PV and €19.8bn for wind, totaling an astonishing 
€54,8 bn of subsidies, between 2000 and 2008, i.e. €6bn per year (as much as 0,1% of German 
GDP in 2008). Moreover, feed-in tariffs to PV and wind power have been proved to be a costly 
and ineffective way of reducing emissions as we can see from Table 1 reporting the abate-
ment costs:
Source Abatement costs (€ per tonne)
PV 716
Wind 54
Emissions certificates 13,4
Table 1—Abatement costs in Germany, 2009 (Source: Frondel, Ritter and Vance 2009)
In the end, German’s feed-in scheme resulted in heavily subsidized regime with per worker 
subsidies as high as €175.000 (considering PV), well above average wages. Moreover, as al-
ready seen in Denmark, RES do not provide energy security, creating the need for back up sys-
tems, such as CHP or fuel-fired, questioning the consistency of potential environmental bene-
fits. Even the occupation numbers are debatable. While it is unquestionable that, in 2008, 
278,000 people were employed in the green sector (mainly in the manufacturing segment, as 
in Denmark) the net effect on occupation is less clear. At the present state of technology, 
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more RES translate into higher energy cost, which, at the margin, increases production costs 
(especially in energy-intensive industries) and destroys, or prevents the creation of jobs in 
other economic sectors. Lehr et al. (2008) argued that the net impact on employment from 
green subsidies in Germany has been, and will be, positive only insofar as Germany remains a 
net technological exporter. That suggests that the economic effect of subsidies, in Germany, 
is to reinvigorate the demand for material assets (such as wind turbines and solar panels), 
which is what requires occupation. Up to now, domestic demand has been unable to sustain 
an extra-employment high enough to counterbalance the negative effects in other sectors. 
What has made the German RES industry profitable is mostly that other EU member States, 
not just Germany, have enforced green targets.
2.3. Nunca mas combatir contra los molinos de viento (Never more against the 
windmills): Spain
Spanish landscape, plenty of windmills, has always filled literature and imagination, since the 
famous “Don Quixote of La Mancha”. No clue, thus, that wind energy draws special attentions 
in Spain, which is usually referred as an example for its fast growing share of RES energy. 
However, Calzada et al. (2009) argued that wind energy is a good idea but “at what price”? 
Indeed, despite its hyper-aggressive green jobs policies, the authors’ computation reports a 
loss of 2.2 jobs per each new green job created, with two different methodologies: the ratio 
of subsidy to RES, per worker, and average capital, per worker; and the ratio between annual 
subsidy to RES, per worker, and average productivity, per worker. Both statistics gave back 
2.2, indicating that, on average, each green job destroys—or prevents—2.2 jobs elsewhere.
In order to support renewable energy, Spain enacted two mechanisms: 1) higher regulated 
rates (feed-in tariff) with electricity utilities forced to buy all renewable energy produced, 
thus making RES a guaranteed and profitable investment; 2) credits and aids from national 
institutes and regional subsidies.
Moreover, with €28.7bn of subsidies, each green job created cost €571,138, principally at the 
expenses of energy-intensive productions, such as metallurgy, non-metallic mining, food 
processing, beverage, tobacco industries and so on. Following Calzada et al., on average, 
each new MW of RES installed destroyed 5.28 jobs elsewhere in the economy: 8.99 by PV, 4.27 
by wind energy and 5.05 by mini-hydro.
In this respect, Spain appears like an example of the distortions created by a system of mini-
mum guaranteed prices or feed-in tariff: a giant “bubble” in the RES, especially PV. As for 
2009, 17,227 and 3,222 MW of, respectively, wind and PV energy were installed in Spain (CNE 
2010). With subsidies representing 1,162% of average or pool price for PV (data for 2004), or 
44 c€/kWh for plants with capacity up to 100kW, the annual growth rate of plants of up to 
100kW reached 122% in 2004 and 2005, and 215% in 2006, creating a large potential for rent-
seeking: an example by the authors suggests that, by leveraging 70% of the cost, a 100kW PV 
plant would yield internal rates of return (IRR) of up to 17% in 2007, 1,200 basis points above 
a 30 year Spanish bond (considered as a benchmark due to similar risks and guarantee), or, 
€100,000 invested would give back, after 25 years, €5.1 mln. In this context, the Royal De-
cree 1578/2008 of September 26th, 2008, tried to stop speculations with a very restrictive 
regulation, in favor of roof installations against ground installations (because massive and 
“speculative” growth focused on this type), imposing a quota of 500 MW of installed capacity 
for 2009. As 3,464 MW have been installed only in 2008, it is not hard to imagine that this 
might have severe repercussions, as also pointed by the Spanish Photovoltaic Industry Associa-
tion (ASIF) which, in a press release of February 2009, estimated 15,000 job losses in the 
months after RD 1578/2008 took effect (ASIF 2009). The situation is not very different in the 
wind sector where, the current law (RD 661/2007) established that wind energy producers 
receive €73.22 per MWh, a figure well above market prices, resulting in an accumulated rate 
deficit since 2000 over € 15 bn.
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2.4. Partial Summary
The table below summarizes some results of the analysis of Denmark, Germany and Spain. 
Country Total Subsidies Avg subsidy per capita Year of the first program Source
Denmark / 9,000$ ;14,000$ 1979 Sharman and Meyer 
2009
Germany €54,8 bn €175,000 1990 (Stromeinspei-
sungsgesetz)
Frondel, Ritter and 
Vance 2009
Spain €28.7bn €571,138 1994 (RD 2366/1994) Calzada et al. (2009)
Table 2—Partial summary: subsidies, total and per capita, for Denmark, Germany and Spain
2.5. Broader evidence
In the public debate on climate policies, a huge emphasis has been placed on the alleged 
pro-growth effects of the “green deal”, as well as on the RES sector’s capability of creating 
jobs. Under a public choice approach, it is easy understood that a coalition of “Baptists and 
Bootleggers” (Yandle 1983) has soon emerged between “Baptists”, or the environmental 
organizations, who “take the moral high ground”, and “Bootleggers”, or vested interests, who 
“persuade politicians quietly or behind closed doors” (Yandle 1998, p.6). While the two 
groups are not necessarily related (although more often than not they are), they form a 
de-fact coalition in promoting a political agenda which tends to be favorable to subsidize RES 
instead of pursuing alternative political goals. 
The relevant economic question is whether the economic net effect of such policies—as 
measured either in terms of GDP created vs. GDP destroyed, or in terms of occupational 
impact—is positive or negative. Given the high number of variables involved, it is very hard to 
cast a definitive answer. In fact, there is no conclusive evidence, although it  is possible to 
derive a few hints from the available literature. 
To start with on a broader terrain, Tol and Yohe (2006) reviewed the studies on the costs and 
benefits of global warming vis-à-vis the costs and benefits of climate policies. They found 
that, despite a wide variability in the literature’s results, tend to agree that the net impact 
of whatever policy is implemented (including the business-as-usual) will hardly be positive. In 
other words, humanity will anyway face costs—the choice being what costs and how distrib-
uted over time, as well as which mix of policy might be best suited to minimize the costs 
(whether environmental or economic) under a great deal of uncertainty. In other words, the 
costs of global warming are somehow of the same order of magnitude as the costs of climate 
policies.
Looking directly at climate policies, Nordhaus (2008) found that too stringent targets are inef-
ficient. By the same token, he found that cap and trade schemes and other forms of incen-
tives tend to be relatively less efficient than a straightforward carbon tax. Finally, he sug-
gested a “policy ramp” whereas a modest carbon tax is adopted, which would increase gradu-
ally over time. Interestingly enough, given the short-run and long run characteristics of en-
ergy demand elasticity, one would expect that a moderate, albeit growing, carbon tax would 
not result in the generation of much green energy. Rather, it can be expected to induce en-
ergy savings in the short run, and a gradual substitution in the energy technologies over the 
medium to long run, as more efficient sources of energy become commercially available. A 
fortiori, one might draw that subsidizing today’s technologies is inefficient (while a case 
might be made for subsidizing Research & Development investments in new RES). Prins et al. 
(2009) reached the same conclusion.
Lehr et al. (2008) looked at the case of Germany, widely regarded as a model in Europe in 
terms of the country’s ability to promote an efficient renewable industry. They argue that the 
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net effect of support to RES on employment may or may not be positive depending on a num-
ber of variables, such as GDP growth, oil prices, etc. However, the most important driver for 
that seems to be a country’s ability to develop a competitive, export-oriented RES industry. 
The practical consequence of such conclusion, if it will be confirmed by further evidence, is 
that only the technological leaders will gain from RES incentives. To state it otherwise, coun-
tries like Germany, which were able to invest on RES soon enough, or others which will be 
able to develop technological breakthrough, will gain from broader policies (such as those at 
the EU level) in terms of job creation or destruction, while the others will lose. Calzada et al. 
(2009) seem to validate such result, as they found that the net occupational effect of Spanish 
RES policies is likely to be negative. On the contrary, Blanco and Rodrigues (2008) argued that 
the wind industry has directly created a significant number of jobs in Europe, although they 
didn’t consider the indirect creation/destruction of jobs. Notwithstanding, most jobs were 
created in just three countries—Germany, Spain, and Denmark, accounting for 82,000 jobs out 
of a total estimate of 110,850, or 74% of the total. As Germany, Spain and Denmark are all 
technology exporters, this is consistent with Lehr et al. (2008)’s argument on Germany. 
Moreover, it may not be inconsistent with the findings of Calzada et al. (2009), who go beyond 
the mere counting of “green jobs” in order to estimate the cost of job creation to the rest of 
the economy.
Contra most of the evidence from past investments in RES, the European Commission (EC 
2007) argue that covering 20% of total energy demand through RES by 2020 would slightly in-
crease Europe’s GDP (which would be 0.5% above the business-as-usual scenario) and would 
create 650,000 additional jobs, or a 0.3% increase. On the opposite, independent estimates 
estimate a cost of as much as € 36 billion annually in 2020, for the EU25 to meet its RES tar-
get (O’Brien and Robinson 2008).
A more recent array of paper has examined the green jobs (or green stimulus) perspectives in 
the US market. Pollin et al. (2008) envisioned a 10-year, US$100 billion-worth “green recovery 
economic programme”. According to the authors, if the same amount was invested on house-
hold consumption or on the oil industry, the number of jobs created would be as low as 1.7 
million and 542,000, respectively. Pollin and Wicks-Lim (2008) examined six green strategi-
es—more or less along the lines of Pollin et al. (2008)—for a cumulative value of US$ 100 bil-
lion, and claim that the relevant workers are available in today’s labor market (which he 
studies with reference to 45 representative occupations in 12 US states). That means that lit-
tle or no training is needed, and that green policies, once implemented, would immediately 
become effective. However, if one looks at the two papers jointly, one would conclude that 
the net job creation would be zero: in fact, green policies would not create new jobs. They 
would rather take people out of their  current occupations and move to new ones. It is argu-
able, although questionable, that this would result in welfare or  environmental gains, but it is 
quite straightforward that this would have no effect on overall employment. If instead—as the 
study seems to suggest—the people to be employed in the green economy are currently un-
employed, not enough skilled workers might be available, especially if the numbers of re-
quired human resources are as high as Pollin et al. (2008) and the studies reviewed below im-
ply, which means that training would be necessary and green policies might have a non-
negligible adjustment cost.
A report prepared by Global Insight for the US Conference of Mayors (2008) estimates that, as 
of today, almost 130,000 green jobs already exists in the US renewable power sector, and 
that—under a scenario whereby electricity generation from RES increases from 124 TWh in 
2008 to 2,175 TWh in 2038—more than 1 million green jobs would be created, up to 1,236,800 
in 2038.
Bezdek (2007), who adopts a broader definition of what the green economy is about, esti-
mates that the number of workers employed in the renewable energy sector might increase 
from 452,000 in 2006 to 16.2-50.1 million, according to the scenario. 
The above studies are critically reviewed by Michaels and Murphy (2009), who find several 
shortcomings—including the confusion between efficient investments and labor-intensive in-
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vestments (which may or may not go together), the lack of attention to the job destruction 
that may arise from more expensive energy, double counting of jobs, an oversimplified vision 
of the labor market, and the presumption that government can just create jobs—with little or 
no attention for the role of the private sector. 
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3. THE ITALIAN ELECTRICITY MARKET
3.1. General overview
With a gross electricity production of 320 TWh (Terna, 2008) in 2008, Italy amounts to 2.1% of 
the world total electricity production (EIA 2009). The third largest producer of nuclear power 
in the ‘60s (with a peak of 8,758 GWh of gross production in 1986), following a Referendum in 
1987, Italy decommissioned all its nuclear power plants, increasing its dependence on exter-
nal energy supplies: a net energy importer since 1926, with only 3 years of exception from 
1952 to 1954 (Terna, 2008), mainly from Switzerland and France (28.8 GWh and 15.2 GWh re-
spectively in 2007, see figure 3), but also Slovenia, Austria and Greece (46.2 GWh were im-
ported in 2007, 40 GWh in 2008, as much as 13.1% and 11.3% of gross electricity demand, re-
spectively). 
Figure 3—Energy imports (in GWh) by country (Source: Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica e il Gas, 
AEEG, website)
Notwithstanding its long history as net importer, Italy has not yet been able to close the gap, 
never falling below 11% of energy import (as % of total demand) during the last 20 years (fig-
ure 4) becoming the largest European importer (Gestore Mercati Elettrici, GME, 2009). It is 
possible that in 2009 electricity import decreased, both in absolute value and as a share of 
total demand, because the demand fell due to the crisis.
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Figure 4—Energy import as % of total demand (Authors' computation based on Terna 2008)
Compared to France, Germany, and to EU-15 (figure 4 and 5), Italy is heavily reliant on natu-
ral gas (with a share of 54% in 2008), coal and oil. While oil used to be a major fuel for elec-
tricity production, since 1998 its contribution has been rapidly falling both in absolute and as 
a share of the total, decreasing from 42.5% in 1990 to 6% in 2008 (figure 6). 
Figure 5—Energy mix in 2008 for Italy, France, Germany and EU-15 (Authors' computation based on 
Terna 2008)
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For the most part, oil has been substituted by natural gas, a cleaner, more flexible fuel, 
which more than doubled its share, from 25,7% in 1998. 
Figure 6—Italian Energy mix: 1998-2007 (Source: Rapporto delle attività del Gestore Servizi Ener-
getici,GSE, 2010c)
The RES quota has been around 20% of the electricity production, of which the largest part is 
covered by old, large hydro plants. Wind power has been growing consistently in the last dec-
ade, while photovoltaic power grew significantly just after the feed-in tariff was introduced in 
2007, but its contribution to the overall production remains negligible (figure 7).
Figure 7 - RES production in Italy by source:1997-2008 –(GWh - Source: GSE 2008)
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The produced-energy-to-installed-capacity ratio (figure 8) shows that geothermal energy, with 
7.8 GWh per MW installed is by far the most productive RES. However, due to its specific na-
ture, it’s naturally constrained (even though recently two new plants added 72MW of power 
and there is a project for further 200MW—Affari Italiani 2009). After geothermal, biomass is 
the second most productive (4.8 GWh per MW), followed by Hydro (2.4), Wind (1.4) and, in 
the end, PV (0.4). Notably, these results are similar to productivity of RES in Spain (Wind: 1.9, 
PV: 0.7, mini-hydro: 2.2, Biomass: 4.1, Source: Calzada et al. 2009) while thermal energy is 
well above RES average (2,5) with a GWh per MW ratio of 3.6.
Figure 8—RES in Italy: MW installed and production (GWh) per MW (Source: Terna 2008)
3.2. Funding & Incentives
The system of incentives to RES in Italy dates back to 1992, when a particular scheme, called 
“CIP6” was introduced.2  Following the GSE approach (GSE, 2007) 1999 can be seen as a 
turning point, when the Directive 96/92/EC of the European Commission was introduced in 
Italy as dlgs 79/99, the so-called “Decreto Bersani”. After 1999, several policy tools to sustain 
green energies have been introduced: Certificati Verdi (“Green Certificates”), Certificati Grigi 
(“Gray Certificates”, following the introduction of the EU Emission Trading Scheme), 
Certificati Bianchi (“White Certificates”), Conto e Nuovo Conto Energia (incentives to 
Photovoltaic), feed-in tariffs and voluntary certificates such as the RECS (Renewables Energy 
Certificate System) and the Garanzia d’Origine (GO –Guarantee of Origin). Moreover, RES 
producers have priority over non-RES producers in the distribution (so-called “priorità di 
dispacciamento”), as for 2003 (GME website)
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2 CIP6/92 stands for  Comitato Interministeriale Prezzi (CIP) decision no.6 of April 29, 1992 (published in 
the official gazette on May 12, 1992), that created a scheme of subsidies for  renewable energy 
sources and “assimilates” (a vague concept under  which a number of non-renewable sources have 
been labelled, including—but not limited to—domestic coal and refining waste). See A. Clò (2008); 
Camera dei Deputati (2009); Donatio et al. (2007). 
3.2.1. CIP6
CIP-6 is the name of the first, and up to 1999, most important program of direct incentives 
for renewables energy in Italy. Its name comes from the resolution (n.6 of April 29th 1992) of 
the “Comitato Interministeriale Prezzi”, CIP, according to Camera dei Deputati (2009), all the 
producers of renewables energy and “assimilate” (similar to renewables) were entitled to sell 
their  energy to ENEL (the state-owned electricity giant) up to 1999, then, following the 
privatization of ENEL and the partial opening of the market, to the Gestore Rete Trasmissione 
Nazionale (GRTN, the Italian Transmission System Operator, TSO, from 2005, GSE), at higher 
than market prices, for a period 8 years, sometimes extended to 15-20 years. The property of 
the Certificati Verdi (“green certificates”, see next paragraph) produced by the incentived 
plants is transferred to the GRTN (then GSE). After that, the TSO would have sold the 
electricity and the CVs, covering the difference between the incentived and market prices 
mainly through an increase in energy taxes, precisely, increasing the A3 Tariff (“Tariffa A3”), 
shifting the cost of the incentives directly to the consumers. From 1995, following the law 
481/95, the ability to change the A3 tariff was given to the brand-new Autorità per l’energia 
elettica ed il gas (AEEG), an independent regulatory body. Moreover, it specified that the CIP6 
would have been granted only to plants already authorised and connected to the grid, 
authorised and under construction, or to those proposals submitted before November 19th 
1995. 
% similar to RES
2003 71
2004 70
2005 69
2006 71
2007 72
2008 73
Table 3—share of “similar to RES” covered by CIP6 (authors’ computation based on GSE data)
This type of system has been the object of several critics due to its definition of “similar to 
renewables” energy supply; indeed, the definition included also cogeneration and CHP, which 
attracted a sizeable share of all the CIP6 incentives (see table 3). However, following the 
introduction of several new incentives, and widely considered as a political scandal, CIP6 has 
been under reduction: it is estimated to end its effects in 2020 but its destiny is still 
uncertain as proved by recent events: a ministerial decree from the Economic Development 
Ministry, attached to the “Legge Finanziaria 2010”, suggested the voluntary resolution within 
6 months of all the agreements involving CIP6.
3.2.2. Certificati Verdi (CV)—Green Certificates
As previously said, up to 1999 there was only one way to finance RES, the CIP6 tariff. The 
so-called Decreto Bersani introduced a new instrument: the Green Certificates (CV); each 
non-RES energy supplier (either producer or importer) is obliged, since January 1st 2002, to 
produce 2% of its energy with RES. This quota has been increased by 0.35 percentage points 
annualy between 2004 and 2006, and by 0.75 percentage points annualy between 2007 and 
2012 (figure 9). Each utility is free to decide whether phisically produce the required amount 
of RES, or to buy an equivalent amount of Green Certificates from other companies who 
produce more green energy than required. The Green Certificates—whose original size 
representing a capacity of 100 MWh was reduced to 50 MWh in 2004 and 1 MWh in 2008—are 
issued to all RES plants which are recognized by the GSE to be RES-E (“IAFR”). The suppliers 
are entitled to obtain an amount of CV proportional to the quantity of energy supplied (up to 
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the “Legge Finanziaria 2008”—see table 4). A Green Certificate expires after 1 years if it was 
released between 1999 and 2007, or 3 years it it was released since 2008 onwards. The CVs 
are traded on a regulated market created and mainteined by the Gestore Mercati Energetici 
(GME), a state-owned company, which is obliged, since 2008, to buy all the unsold and 
expiring CVs, even though, most of the bargainings happen by bilateral agreements (AEEG 
2009a). Moreover, as previously stated, the CVs produced by CIP6 plants are entitled to the 
GSE. This obligation has risen several controversies. Moreover, the GME is expected to set a 
buying and selling reference prices which can indeed provide incentives.The law 244/2007, or 
“Legge Finanziaria 2008”, introduced several changes, the most important ones being: 
• the size of each CV has been reduced to 1 MWh (and the assignation is no longer pro-
portional to the power capacity but differentiated according to the type of RES, see 
table 4); 
• recognized suppliers (whose plants will be start operations from January 1, 2008) will 
obtain the incentive for 15 years (12 years for those built before);
•  all producers whose power capacity is lower than 1MW can opt between CV and the 
so-called “tariffa omnicomprensiva” (see next paragraph); 
Energy Source Number of CV per MWh of energy
Wind on-shore(power capacity > 200kW) 1.0
Wind off-shore 1.50
Solar See “Conto Energia”
Geothermal 0,90
Waves and tides 1,80
Hydro (other than waves and tides) 1,0
Biomass and biogas (other than those indicated in 
the following point) 1,30
Biomass and biogas obtained from agricolture, 
animal husbandry and forestry on a short sup-
ply-line basis
1,80*
Landfill gas and waste gas from purification pro-
cesses and biogas (other than those indicated in 
the previous point)
0,80
Table 4—Coefficient of CV per MWh of energy produced by energy source (Source: GSE 2010)
* Subordinated to the approval of the Ministerial Decree
What is the impact of the two main programs (CIP6 and CV) on the RES development? Data 
from Table 5 give us several insights: biomass, wind and biogas are completely covered by 
CIP6 and CV schemes, while hydro and geothermal are not fully covered. If we take into ac-
count only small hydro (i.e. plants with power capacity less than 10 MW), we can see that 
both schemes aim to incentive especially small hydro (the share increase from 9.3% to 43,7%). 
Interestingly, as the CIP6 scheme is going to disappear, geothermal (26,3%) and especially 
biomass (80,8%) and biogas (67,1%), which are heavily reliant on CIP6, will need to find an-
other supportive scheme.
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quota Year of 
compliance
2001 2.00% 2002
2002 2.00% 2003
2003 2.00% 2004
2004 2.35% 2005
2005 2.70% 2006
2006 3.05% 2007
2007 3.80% 2008
2008 4.55% 2009
2009 5.30% 2010
2010 6.05% 2011
2011 6.80% 2012
2012 7.55% 2013
Figure 9—Quota of green energy compliance with yearly increase (Source: GSE)
Not surprisingly, solar is just receiving a small coverage and only by the CV scheme; this is ob-
vious, as there is a specific feed-in scheme for PV, called “Conto Energia” (see paragraph 
4.2.4).
Hydro Geother Biomass Wind Biogas Solar Total
Total gross energy 36,994 5,527 5,408 2,971 1,336 35 52,275
Gross Energy without 
hydro > 10 MW 7,875 5,527 5,408 2,971 1,336 35 23,156
Energy under CV sche-
me 2,123 845 447 1,745 439 1 5,602
Energy under CIP6 
scheme 1,321 1,454 4,367 1,226 897 0 9,265
% gross energy under 
CV scheme 5.7% 15.3% 8.3% 58.7% 32.9% 2.9% 10.7%
% gross energy under 
CIP6 scheme 3.6% 26.3% 80.8% 41.3% 67.1% 0.0% 17.7%
% gross energy under 
both schemes 9.3% 41.6% 89.1% 100.0% 100.0% 2.9% 28.4%
% gross energy under 
both schemes, without 
hydro > 10 MW
43.7% 41.6% 89.1% 100.0% 100.0% 2.9% 64.2%
Table 5—% of RES by incentive scheme, GWh, 2006 (Source: GSE 2007)
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3.2.3. Tariffa omni-comprensiva—feed-in tariffs scheme
A new all-inclusive feed-in tariffs scheme was introduced with the “Legge Finanziaria 2008” 
(law 244/2007). It affects RES plants (with the notable exclusion of solar power, see “Conto 
Energia”), whose power capacity is not exceeding 1 MW (200 kW for on-shore wind farms), 
commissioned after December 31, 2007. The scheme will support qualified RES suppliers for 
15 years and it is differentiated by source (see table 6)
Energy Source Feed-in tariff (c€ per kWh)
Wind (power capacity < 200kW) 30
Solar See “Conto Energia”
Geothermal 20
Waves and tides 34
Hydro (other than waves and tides) 22
Biomass and biogas obtained from agriculture, 
animal husbandry and forestry under supply-line 
or frame-agreements or  on a short supply-line 
basis
28
Landfill gas and waste gas from purification 
processes and biogas (other than the biogas indi-
cated in the previous point)
18
Table 6—Feed-in tariff for 2008 (Source: GSE 2010)
3.2.4. Conto Energia—incentives to solar energy
Since 2005, a specific policy tool has been introduced to support PV energy, the so-called 
“Conto Energia”—which could rely on a strong propaganda effort based upon the idea that the 
“Paese del Sole” should rely on solar power. From 2008, the “Conto Energia” became the only 
available scheme to incentive PV, with CV available only to PV plants which requested before 
the end of 2007 (GSE, 2009b). Owners of PV plants of at least 1 kW of nominal power can 
benefit for 20 years of a particular feed-in tariff scheme (see table 7 for old Conto Energia, 
and table 8 for Nuovo Conto Energia), which has been recently modified in order to encourage 
small, house-integrated, panels. 
Nominal power of the plant (kW)
1 <= P <= 20 0.445 (net metering)
0.460
20 < P <= 50 0.460
50 < P <= 1000 0.490 (max value)
Table 7—Conto Energia—details (Source: GSE 2007)
In alternative to the feed-in tariff, the owner could opt for a net metering scheme (“Scambio 
sul posto”), i.e. a solution in which producers may inject immediately the energy produced 
into the national grid and withdrawing it when needed; they will receive subsidy from GSE 
(GSE, 2009) that adds to the value of the electricity sold. 
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Type of PV plant
Nominal power of the plant (kW) Not integrated (into the house) Partly integrated Integrated
1 < P < = 3 0.392 0.431 0.480
3 < P < = 20 0.372 0.412 0.451
P > 20 0.353 0.392 0.431
Table 8—Nuovo Conto Energia—details (Source: GSE 2007)
Given the great popularity of the first “Conto Energia” and some technical and bureaucratic 
problem, a new edition (“Nuovo Conto Energia”) has been issued in 2007, with the following 
differences:
• a simpler authorization process;
• the elimination of the 1000 kW cap for each owner, substituted by a national maximum 
amount of 1,200 MW ;
• a new feed-in tariffs scheme which encourages small, house-integrated panels.
3.2.5. Renewable Energy Certificate System (RECS) and Garanzia d’Origine (GO)
GSE also releases the so-called Renewable Energy Certificate System (RECS) certificates to 
renewables energy producers. This is a voluntary scheme only, and once issued, RECS certifi-
cates (1 MW each) can be exchanged at national and international level without any time 
limit. In 2001, first year of the scheme in Italy, 11,400 certificates have been issued; in 2008 
the number has risen to 7mln (GSE website), so that Italy is now the 5th largest member of the 
RECS scheme in Europe.
3.2.6. Titoli di efficienza energetica (TEE)—Energy Efficiency Certificates
Also known as “white certificates”, TEEs have been created in 2004, first case in the world, in 
order to incentive energy efficiency. The system started its operation on January 2005. All 
energy/gas distributors with more than 50,000 customers are obliged to achieve a certain 
share of energy efficiency (according to the national targets of energy efficiency, e.g. 1,8 
Mtoe). National targets and details are provided by Ministry of Economic Development, and 
precisely, by the latest D.M. 21/12/07 A single TEE certifies the reduction of consumption of 1 
toe (tonne of oil equivalent); there are three types of TEEs, certifying : 
• Type 1) reduction of final energy consumption; 
• Type 2) reduction of natural gas consumption; 
• Type 3) energy savings other than points 1 and 2. 
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Figure 10 - Breakdown by type of TEE traded up to December 2008 (Source: AEEG 2008)
Electricity and gas distributors may achieve their energy efficiency targets either by imple-
menting energy efficiency projects, or by purchasing TEEs from third parties, that are traded 
on a specific market managed by the GME. Up to December 3, 2008, a total amount of 2.7 
mln TEEs had been traded (AEEG 2008), mainly Type 1 TEEs (see figure 10).
3.2.7. Certificati Grigi—Emissions Trading Scheme
In 2006, with the dlgs 216/06, Italy acknowledged the Directive 2003/87/EC, creating a Euro-
pean Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), which came into force on January 1, 2005. The Di-
rective is part of a broader EU policy, aimed at meeting the Kyoto Protocol’s goal of cutting 
carbon emissions by 8% below 1990 levels, by 2008-2012. A National Committee for the man-
agement and implementation of the Directive 2003/87/EC ("Comitato nazionale di gestione e 
attuazione della direttiva 2003/87/CE") was established to govern the transition in 2006. Ac-
cording to the scheme, each qualified firms (energy producers, iron and steel industries) 
should satisfy two requirements:
1) it can no longer produce without being authorized 
2) the total amount of tonne of CO2 released into the atmosphere should be compensated 
by an equivalent amount of emission allowance 
Each country concurs with the European Commission for the definition of targets and quotas 
through a National Allocation Plan (NAP); for Italy, the decision is jointly taken by the Ministry 
of Economic Development (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, MSE) and the Ministry of the 
Environment (Ministero dell’ambiente e della tutela del territorio e del mare). Up to now 
there have been two NAPs, one involving the first period (2005-2007) and one for the second 
(2008-2012). Despite the huge emphasis that has been put on ETS, so far the European cap 
and trade scheme has failed to reduce emissions. In fact, in 2005-7 emissions in the ETS-
sectors actually increased, while in 2008 and most probably in 2009 they have been falling 
largely as a result of the economic crisis, rather than of policy-induced changes (S. Clò 2008; 
S. Clò 2009; Stagnaro 2009).
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4. COSTS ASSESSMENT OF RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES IN ITALY
As the feed-in tariff regime (the so-called “tariffa omnicomprensiva”) has recently been en-
acted, there are no available data concerning the amount of subsidies to RES. The same is 
true for all contributions at local level, such as regional and departmental (“province”) funds. 
Thus we focus on three main scheme: CIP6, Conto Energia and CVs.
4.1 CIP6
As for the CIP6 component, data before 2003 are not publicly available; the total amount of 
CIP6 subsidies between 1992 and 2003 has been the object of several hearings at the X Com-
missione “Attivita’ Produttive” (Commission for productive activities) of the Italian Lower 
Chamber; during the public hearing of November 6th 2003, the President of the Commission, 
Mr. Bruno Tabacci, stated that “Up to now there is no plausible list of the similar to RES 
sources, neither a clear definition of the criteria for being selected” (Camera dei Deputati 
2003). CIP 6 was originally intended as a device to incentive market liberalization and renew-
able energy but most of it (over 70%) has been used to finance “similar to RES” plants, which 
included also biomass and other “what we do know is that there is a regime, the so-called 
CIP6, which gives same guarantees to RES and to those who recycle not biodegradable wastes 
(…) a tariff, far above energy market prices”. Mr. Tabacci defines CIP6 as a “shadow tax”, 
whose burden of taxpayers was estimated (in 2003) in 60.000mld of Italian Lire (almost € 31 
bn at current prices). In the next table we can see a breakdown of CIP6 subsidy by year (table 
9); in the first column “costs”, there are the amounts paid by GRTN, then GSE, to the CIP6 
producers, by type of sources (RES or similar to RES). In the second and third columns the 
revenues from the energy and CV sold, covering part of the costs, in the last column, “A3 
component”, there is the amount, the difference between costs and revenues, which has 
been covered yearly by the A3 component of the electricity bill; the A3 component (around 
62% of the regulated part of the electricity bill) and the A2 component (22%, covering the de-
commissioning of the past Italian nuclear energy program) are worth as much as around 6% of 
the average electricity bill (referring to households).
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2003 REVENUES
COSTS Energy sold CV sold A3 component 
Similar to RES 3,281.4 2,248.3 1,033.1
RES 1,341.9 531.6 196.2 614
Total CIP6 4,623.2 2,779.9 196.2 1,647
2004 REVENUES
COSTS Energy sold CV sold A3 component 
Similar to RES 3,511.4 2,145.1 1,366.3
RES 1,510.9 515.9 90.3 904.7
Total CIP6 5,022.3 2,661 90.3 2,271
other 281
total c/R 5,303.3 2,878.5 90.3 2,334.5
2005 REVENUES
COSTS Energy sold CV sold A3 component 
Similar to RES 3,988.6
RES 1,709.5 96.8
Total CIP6 5,765.7 2,560.5 96.8
other 67.6
total c/R 5,765.7 2,560.5 96.8 3,108.4
2006 REVENUES
COSTS Energy sold CV sold A3 component 
Similar to RES 4,3617
RES 1,758.1
Total CIP6 6,119.8 2.8
Other 297.2
total c/R 6,417 2,736.3 2.8 3,677.9
2007 REVENUES
COSTS Energy sold CV sold A3 component 
Similar to RES 3,746.5
RES 1,476.7
Total CIP6 5,223.2 -0.1
Other 34.4
total c/R 5,257.7 2,834.6 -0.1 2,423.2
2008 REVENUES
COSTS Energy sold CV sold A3 component 
Similar to RES 3,965.8
RES 1,497.7
Total CIP6 5,463.5 31.3
Other 15.7
total c/R 5,479.1 3,052.7 31.3 2,395.1
Figure 8—CIP6 subsidy, 2003-2008 (AEEG 2003-2009a)
The sum of the CIP6 subsidy from 2003 on is equal to €15,6 bn. Adding the €31 bn figure esti-
mated by Mr Tabacci from 1992 to 2002, we have a rough estimate of the total cost of the 
CIP6 program at € 46,6 bn or €3 bn per year on average, half the yearly expenditure in Ger-
many (€6 bn), whereas the German share of RES is far above the Italian one.
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4.2 Green Certificates/Certificati Verdi
As for the CVs, the cost of the system can only be estimated, as the utilities, which are 
obliged to buy them, shift the cost directly to the final users. AEEG (2009c), estimated the 
total cost from 2002 (see table 9) on, forecasting it at € 1 bn for 2012, when the quota for 
each producer will reach 7.55%.
Total cost to RES producers (IAFR) contribution to A3 comp
2002 247 50 197
2003 243 74 169
2004 263 163 100
2005 332 317 15
2006 488 487 1
2007 306 305 1
Table 9—Costs of the CV system
4.3 Conto Energia and Nuovo Conto Energia (PV)
As for the PV, Italy has nowadays one of the most generous and profitable system of incen-
tives . The so-called “Conto Energia”, and its new edition, issued in 2008, the “Nuovo Conto 
Energia”, provide a feed-in tariff to all PV producers within a national limit of 1,200MW 
(which should be met before December 31st 2010). The incentives are covered through the A3 
component of the electricity bill, with an estimated cost of € 110 mln for 2008 and an esti-
mate of € 300 mln for 2009. The AEEG (2009b and 2009c) estimates that the cost of the cur-
rent PV scheme (assuming that the target will be met) will be of €1 bn per year for 20 years, 
covering only 0.5% of total energy supply. No clue that the same AEEG defines the “Conto En-
ergia” as one of the most profitable system of incentive available in the whole world!
4.4 Further considerations
Finally, it has been pointed out that the actual system of incentives is highly iniquitous as all 
the incentives are funded through the electricity bill (and particularly through the A3 energy 
component), thus proportionally to energy consumption (which is not proportional to net in-
come). In this way, a large family will contribute to a greater degree, compared to a single 
rich, to the system of incentive. AEEG (2009c), estimated that, as for 2008, the A3 component 
is worth 6% of the total expenditure of an average individual.
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5. O DATA WHERE ART THOU?—GREEN JOBS IN ITALY
The increase in green jobs is likely to affect the existing jobs by two effects: 1) job losses re-
sulting from the crowding out of cheaper and more conventional forms of energy generation; 
2) job losses in energy intensive sectors, due to higher energy prices (required to sustain the 
incentives). The EC argues that that the number of green jobs created will likely outnumber 
the job losses. However, the situation is almost paradoxical; notwithstanding several pro-
claims by the EC in favor of the green economy, up to now there is no standard time series 
regarding the number of green jobs, neither a total nor a break down by type of RES. So far, 
not even an harmonized estimate of the national expense on green subsidies has been made 
available by the EU, making it impossible to verify whether political promises are supported 
by data.
How is it possible to evaluate the effectiveness—leave aside the efficiency—of a program if 
the target variable (the number of green jobs in EU) is not even available? How can we even 
try to understand if the green economy is really creating jobs (and not simply shifting or 
eliminating somewhere else), if we have no clue about the number of people actually working 
for the green economy? As we have seen in section 2, data for Germany, Spain and Denmark 
usually come from private subjects, who—in most cases—have a vested interest in supporting 
the green agenda. The situation in Italy is by no means different: as the National Institute for 
Statistics (ISTAT) does not directly collect the number of people working in the RES industry, 
we had to rely on different sources (table 10); we are aware that our pieces of information 
are fragment and there is too much variability of the estimates (eg. the figure of the direct 
employed into wind energy ranges from 2500 to 6300!), but it is neither our job nor in our 
power to provide these data: these were supposed to be already available at European level. 
This lack of transparency should ring a bell about the accountability of this program, which is 
worth billions of euro.
Source direct indirect total ref year
PhotoVoltaic Energy CNES 5700 2008
CENSIS 15000 2009
Geothermal Energy
CENSIS 3000 2009
Biofuels
CENSIS 700 2009
WIND Energy Nomisma Energia 10000 2009
ANEV/UIL 3544 13630 17174 2007
EWEA 2500 2007
CENSIS 6300 21800 28100 2009
Table 10—Estimates of green jobs—several sources
Remark: A 2003 European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) analysis of wind energy employment in 
the EU-15 found that, at aggregated EU level, direct employment constituted 60% of total direct 
and indirect employment in wind turbine manufacturing
5.1. Defining the scenarios
The huge variability in estimates has, at least, a positive feature: it allows us to build an op-
timistic and a pessimistic scenario, by picking the higher and lower estimates, respectively. A 
greater problem derives from the fact that different estimates relate to different years. We 
can assume, though, that the number of people employed is proportional to the installed ca-
pacity for each RES: this will allow us to reconcile data into a common framework, however 
questionable. 
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We will consider estimates on total jobs—including both direct and indirect jobs—although 
this is likely to lead us to overestimate job creation, especially when the source for data is a 
supposedly biased one. 
Finally, one peculiarity of green jobs is that most of them are (a) highly specialized and (b) 
temporary. In fact, while a small number of people are employed in the administration and 
management of existing RES plants, a much greater number of workers are involved in the 
development—including engineers designing the project, installers and builders, and people 
who are occupied in pursuing the licensing process. We will assume that permanent occupa-
tion is a function of the existing capacity at any given point in time, and we shall assume that 
there is some scale effect—i.e., if the existing capacity is multiplied by a factor x, the per-
manent occupation is multiplied by a factor y < x. On the contrary, we will assume that tem-
porary occupation is a function of new capacity, and we will assume there is no economy of 
scale, i.e., if installing x MW requires n people, installing x * y MW requires n * y people. 
Barbatella et al. (2009) estimate both temporary and permanent occupation, both for wind 
and PV power. While their estimates on temporary occupation seem to validate our assump-
tion,3 estimates on permanent occupation seem to suggest quite the opposite—that there is 
indeed a diseconomy of scale.4  However such result is very much counterintuitive, and is 
most probably a consequence of the particular methodology employed (I/O matrixes) and the 
way it is performed. 
According to EWEA (2009), green workers in the wind industry are divided as shown in the 
graph below: 
Figure 11—Wind industry’ jobs distribution—breakdown by type of activity (EWEA 2009)
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3 For  wind power, new capacity in 2020 would be 0.12 times new capacity in 2009, and temporary oc-
cupation would be 0.10 times. For PV, the ratios are 8.8 and 4.3, respectively. 
4 For  wind power, installed capacity in 2020 would be 2.2 times installed capacity in 2009, while per-
manent occupation would be 7.2 times higher. For PV, the ratios are 25.8 and 41.8, respectively.
As it can be easily seen, over half of the green jobs belong to the manufacturing sector, which 
is not as developed in Italy as it is in other EU member states. We have deliberately ignored 
this fact, by accepting existing estimates even though they often rely on international 
benchmarks (which, in turn, incorporate a large number of green jobs in the upstream indus-
try). This leads us to grossly overestimate the number of jobs. Looking at the composition of 
jobs, we have estimated that, in the reference year (2007-2009 depending on the source) 20% 
of the jobs were permanent ones, i.e. related with the existing capacity, while the remaining 
80% are temporary jobs, i.e. they are needed insofar as new capacity is engineered, devel-
oped, or built. 
Incidentally, the 20/80% figure is consistent with the only two studies that differentiate be-
tween direct and indirect employment (under the assumption that most direct jobs tend to be 
permanent ones, while most indirect jobs tend to be temporary ones): ANEV/UIL finds a 
20.6/79.4% ratio, CENSIS finds a 22.4/77.6%. Both studies are about wind power: we will as-
sume the same ratio applies to PV power.
To estimate the model parameters, we have further assumed that, in the short run, perma-
nent and temporary jobs stand in a fix proportion with regard to total and new capacity, re-
spectively. Starting from punctual estimate, then, we have been able to derive reasonable 
estimates for three years (2007-2009). Obviously the total number of jobs is the sum of tem-
porary and permanent jobs. 
At this point, we can develop an optimistic and a pessimistic scenario,5 deriving the ratio of 
temporary and permanent jobs per MW installed according to the existing studies. To build 
our scenario and produce our long term estimates, we assume that the number of jobs is the 
sum of two function: one representing temporary jobs, the other representing permanent 
jobs. The former is a linear function of the new capacity that comes onstream—i.e., tempo-
rary jobs depend on the flow of new investments—while the latter is non-linear function of 
the total capacity at a given point in time—i.e. it depends on the existing stock of capacity, 
and takes into account a modest effect from scale economies. To account for the non-
linearity we have assumed that jobs is proportional to the existing capacity at a 0.99 power. 
The functional forms we have assumed are the following:
Where Ji, JiT and JiP are the number of total, temporary and permanent jobs in year i, respec-
tively; CiN and Ci are the new capacity and total capacity installed in year i, respectively; and 
mT, mP, bT and bP are constants. Arguably, we have set bT and bP equal to zero, because the 
number of jobs, both permanent and temporary, falls to zero when no capacity is installed 
and no new capacity comes onstream.
5.2. Photovoltaic power
As to PV power, CNES estimates 5,700 jobs in 2008, whereas CENSIS estimates 15,000 jobs in 
2009 and CNEL estimates 15,239 jobs for the same year. According to Terna (2008), in 2008 a 
PV gross capacity of as much as 431,504 kW was installed, producing as much as 193 GWh, 
while only 86,750 kW were in function at the end of 2007. By the end of 2009, 750,574 kW 
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5 The choice of “optimism” and “pessimism” refers merely to the number  of jobs that have been “cre-
ated”. Of course, all else being equal, since the revenues to the green industry are a given, one may 
expect workers to earn less in the “optimistic” scenario, and to earn more in the “pessimistic” sce-
nario. For the employed workers “optimism” may have a different meaning than for  the supporters of 
“green jobs”.
had been onstream. Hence, while most of the capacity in function at the end of 2008 had 
been built that very year, more than half of the capacity existing in 2009 had already been in 
function. By factoring out the different proportion, having estimated permanent and tempo-
rary jobs, and recalculating the values for the missing years (under the assumption that we 
may employ fixed proportion between capacity and employment in the short run), we find 
the following estimates. As it will be seen, estimates on the number of green jobs in the PV 
sector in Italy is particularly high: a suspect of a systematic bias upwards naturally arises. Ta-
ble 11 summarizes. 
2007 2008 2009
Pessimistic Scenario
Total jobs 1,282 5,633 6,203
Temporary jobs 1,053 4,360 4,220
Permanent jobs 229 1,273 1,983
Optimistic Scenario
Total jobs 3,340 14,598 15,000
Temporary jobs 2,993 10,966 12,000
Permanent jobs 347 1,832 3,000
Table 11. Number of jobs in the PV power industry. Source: own elaboration on CNES, CENSIS.
5.3. Wind power
For wind power, we have very disomogeneous estimates, which need to be adjusted to 2008 
in order to assess which one is the most optimistic, and which one is the most pessimistic 
one. Table 12, below, reports the results from our estimates, including the operations we 
have described. Notably, for wind power MITRE (a EU-sponsored programme aimed at assess-
ing the perspective of RES in the EU member states) forecasts a negative rate of employment, 
or a loss of jobs, subsequent to the lack of an upstream industry. We reject this scenario, al-
though we recognize it is a possibility. 
2007 2008 2009
Pessimistic Scenario
Total jobs 7,969 9,238 10,000
Temporary jobs 6,786 7,576 8,000
Permanent jobs 1,183 1,642 2,000
Optimistic Scenario
Total jobs 22,394 25,966 28,100
Temporary jobs 19,069 21,652 22,480
Permanent jobs 3,325 4,314 5,620
Table 12. Number of jobs in the wind power industry. Source: own elaboration on Nomisma Ener-
gia, CENSIS.
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6. THE BILL, PLEASE
In this section we will try to estimate the per capita cost of PV and wind energy subsidies in 
2008. As previously stated, concerning the costs of RES we have three sources: CIP6, Conto 
Energia and CVs. We have no data for the “tariffa onnicomprensiva” so we will assume this 
didn’t contribute at all to PV and wind energy in 2008.
6.1.Cip6
According to AEEG (2009c), in 2008 CIP6 net subsidies (i.e., the difference between the cost 
of subsidies and the market value of the generated electricity) totaled € 2.3 bn, of which € 
0.95 bn (41%) for RES and € 1.37 bn for “similar to RES” sources (59%). Of the € 0.95 bn dedi-
cated to “real” RES, the largest beneficiaries of subsidies were biomass, biogas, and waste-
to-energy plants (with 30%, 11%, and 34% of the subsidies, respectively). PV energy didn’t 
benefit at all from CIP6, while wind energy got € 174.2 mln.
Wind energy 174.2
PV energy 0
Table 13. CIP6 net revenues to wind and PV energy [€ mln] in 2008.
6.2. Green certificates
AEEG (2009c) estimates the total cost of CV in 2008 to be around € 400 mn. To estimate how 
many CV actually remunerated wind power, we shall look at the actual or estimated energy 
production. Since the total amount of PV energy is relatively small, we will assume that CV 
didn’t contribute in any way to PV energy production. 
The GSE publishes an yearly Bulletin with the results for the market of CVs (“Bollettino Certi-
ficati Verdi”). The last available Bulletin refers to the situation up to June 30th 2009, pub-
lished in December 2009 but made available online in January 2010 (GSE 2010). We remark 
that at the beginning of 2008, the IAFR producers request for 10,337,326 CVs initially, but, 
after taking into account the real amount of green energy produced during the year, and the 
compensation with previous years, the GSE subtracted 824,372 CVs. However, due to greater 
than expected energy production, the GSE gave back 463.303, with a total net amount of CVs 
for 2008 of 10.800.629 CV’s, mainly due to hydro (GSE 2010). As for wind energy, the GSE en-
titled 232 plants (+93% y-o-y), or 3,614 GWh (equivalent to 3,614,258 CVs) of incentive en-
ergy.
As regards the value of CVs, starting from 2006, there has been a constant disalignment be-
tween market price of 1 CV and the price suggested by the GSE. Particularly, during 2007 and 
2008, wide fluctuations have been observed, with the price crashing from 100 €/MWh to 60 €/
MWh during the first semester of 2008 (vis-à-vis a suggested price of 112.88 €/MWh), recoup-
ing only from October. The “Legge Finanziaria 2008” introduced a new methodology of the 
reference price for CV; the new price will be the difference between 180 and the average 
selling price of energy (as defined by the AEEG) with respect to the previous year. This will 
result in the following prices for, respectively, 2008 and 2009: 112.88€/MWh and 88.66 
112.88€/MWh (GSE 2010). In the end, the average price, as suggested by the AEEG (2009a) for 
2008, was of 92.1 €/MWh, which we will take as reference. Summing up all these information, 
we can estimate a total of € 332.9 mln for wind energy due to CV.
Wind energy 332.9
PV energy 0
Table 14. CVs net revenues to wind and PV energy [€ mln] in 2008.
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6.3. Conto energia and Nuovo conto energia
AEEG (2009c) estimated that incentives for PV (including both the Conto energia and the 
Nuovo conto energia) totalled € 110 mln in 2008. The GSE (2010b) reports that between Octo-
ber 2008 and August 2009, the sum of both program (conto energia + nuovo conto energia) 
amounted to € 144 mln while in the same period one year before that was only € 39 mln, sug-
gesting that € 110 mln could be a conservative estimate.
Wind energy 0
PV energy 110.0
Table 15. Conto energia and Nuovo conto energia [€ mln] in 2008.
6.4. Summing up
In the Table 16,below, we estimate the total amount of subsidies to PV and wind Energy in 
2008, as well as the net subsidy per worker both in the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, 
as defined above.
 Wind PV
Total installed capacity [MW] 3,537.578 431.504
Energy production [GWh] 4,861.3 193.0
Total incentives [mln €] 507.07 110
Optimistic scenario
Green jobs 25,966 14,598
Jobs-to-Subsidies [jobs / mn €] 51.18 132.4
Subsidies-to-jobs [€ / job] 19,535 7,555
Pessimistic scenario
Green jobs 9,238 5,633
Jobs-to-Subsidies [jobs / €] 18.2 51.1
Subsidies-to-jobs [€ / job] 54.892 19,568
Table 16. Summary of all the results for each scenario
Depending on the scenario, according to our estimates, on average a green job costs 19,535-
54,892 euro in pure subsidies in the wind power, or 7,555-19,568 euro in pure subsidies in the 
PV, in 2008. The figures for PV are apparently lower than for wind power, probably due to a 
more significant overestimation of the number of green jobs. Obviously, that is a partial in-
formation. On the one hand, RES industry doesn’t get just subsidies: it also has revenues from 
the market value of the energy produced. On the other hand, labor cost is by no means its 
only, or major, cost. 
We know that, in 2008, 4,861.3 GWh were produced from wind power and 191.3 GWh were 
produced from PV power. Under the existing schemes, PV power is entirely remunerated un-
der a feed-in tariff, while wind power is remunerated both through the market price of the 
generated energy, and the associated CVs. A regulatory subsidy also exists, as (a) electricity 
consumers pay for the cost of connecting RES to the national grid (however distant they may 
be), and (b) green energy is entitled to priority access through the grid (so-called “priorità di 
dispacciamento”). We will not factor in the regulatory subsidies, partly because it is very 
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hard to tell their actual value, and partly because this allows us to provide a very conserva-
tive estimate. 
Since the average price for electricity in 2008 (PUN) was as high as 86.99 €/MWh (AEEG 
2009a), we can estimate the value of the wind energy generated in 2008 to be as high as 
422.8 million euro. This adds to the subsidies, raising the figure up to 930 million euro or 
+119,9% with respect to average price while, regarding PV, the average cost is 570 € / MW , or 
655.2% above market price.
Table 17 summarizes.
Wind Power PV Power
Subsidies [mln €] 507.1 110.2
Market revenues [mln €] 422.9 16.8
Total revenues [mln €] 930 110
Average cost [€ / MWh] 191.3 570
Difference from market price (PUN) [%] +119.9 +655.2
Table 17. Average cost of green energy in Italy in 2008. Source: own elaboration.
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7. ARE GREEN JOBS REAL JOBS?
In this last chapter, we will try to evaluate the effectiveness of the green economy in creating 
jobs and/or spurring economic growth. To be fair, we should emphasize that not necessarily 
job creation and growth acceleration go together. Green economy might turn out to be pro-
growth while not being labor-intensive; or it might prove to be labor-intensive but with little 
or no positive effect on growth.
We will compare the results obtained for green energies with the industry sector, as well as 
the economy in general. There is a rationale for doing so. In the first place, one may expect 
that—all else being equal—the higher costs of energy would largely impact the industry sector, 
as other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture and services, are very little energy-
intensive and tend not be much sensible to variations in electricity prices. As a consequence, 
one might expect some substitution effect as a consequence of the green economy: all else 
being equal, more green jobs would translate into higher energy prices, and thus a lower job 
creation (or a faster job destruction) and a lower return on capital, and/or less investments, 
in the rest of the industrial sector. Finally, the green industry is often presented as an alter-
native to the industrial model of development: in the ideal green world, we don’t expect—nor 
do its proponents expect, as is clear, for example, from Lovins et al. (2004)—to see less serv-
ices, but less (or, which is the same, different) energy-intensive production processes and 
goods. By the same token, we will assume that there will be no substitution effect for the 
employment in the conventional power sector, as green energy production and green jobs 
grow. Such assumption is supported by the estimates developed by Barbabella et al. (2009). 
While these authors argue that the net economic and occupational impact from green subsi-
dies is highly positive, they show that the substitution effect is mostly about energy-intensive 
activities, not conventional energy production.
7.1. Capacity, jobs, subsidies
First of all, we have estimated the capacity that will come onstream until 2020. To do so, we 
have assumed that in 2020 Italy will have installed its maximum potential renewable capacity, 
as defined in the Italian government’s 2007 position paper (Governo Italiano 2007). So, we 
have assumed a capacity of 9,500 MW for PV and 20,200 MW for wind power in 2020. Then we 
have estimated the new capacity that will be installed yearly, by fitting the past capacity as 
well as the projected capacity for 2020. We have done so through a polynomial regression of 
4th order for wind and 5th order for PV. We have picked the order by minimizing the R2 coeffi-
cient, that measures how well the fitting curve approximates the observed points. Figures 12 
and 13 illustrates our results.
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Figure 12. Installed (1995-2009), projected (2020), and estimated (2010-2019) PV capacity (MW). 
Source: own elaboration on GSE (2010), Terna (2009), Italian Government (2007).
Figure 13. Installed (1995-2009), projected (2020), and estimated (2010-2019) wind capacity 
(MW). Source: own elaboration on GSE (2010), Terna (2009), Italian Government (2007).
This is likely to be an overestimate of the capacity that will be installed, as the Italian Gov-
ernment itself defines it as a “theoretic potential” that is “conditional to a number of issues, 
political, institutional, economic and technological” (p.7). 
Subsequently, we have estimated the amount of subsidies that have been, and will be, per-
ceived because of the installed capacity. The amount of subsidies is dependent on the politi-
cal choices as well as on the energy actually produced. As for the former, we have assumed 
no major change will occur: particularly, we have deliberately ignored the reduction of subsi-
dies from the Nuovo Conto Energia (see paragraph 4.2.4), thus potentially overestimating the 
total subsidies—at least for PV power. On the other hand, we don’t know how much green en-
ergy will be produced in the next decade. However, from existing data we know that the 
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amount of energy produced per MW installed has been decreasing steadily in the last decade: 
if fell from 1738 MWh/MW in 1999 to 1336 MWh/MW in 2008 for wind power, and from 1000 
MWh/MW in 1999 to 447 MWh/MW in 2008 for PV power (as deducted from data made avail-
able by Terna). This is consistent with the assumption that the “low hanging fruit” has already 
been picked: on average, new installation will be made under less favorable conditions (i.e., 
they will be placed in less windy or less exposed to the Sun places than the existing capacity). 
We have chosen not to take into account such phenomenon, hence we have overestimated 
production (hence subsidies). We have assumed that the two changes offset each other. To do 
so, we have calculated the average amount of subsidies per MW in 2006-2008 for wind power, 
but as far as PV is concerned we have picked only the 2008 figure as representative of the 
ratio subsidies / capacity, because poor data were available before 2008 and because policies 
were less favorable before that date. 
Finally, we have assumed after 2020 no new capacity will be installed. This allows us to esti-
mate both subsidies and jobs for 15 years after 2020 for wind power (as CVs expire after 15 
years) and for 20 years after 2020 for PV (as the Nuovo Conto Energia expires after 20 years). 
Obviously, we have taken into account that, year by year, capacity older than 15 or 20 years 
will be no longer subsidized.
For the same period of time (i.e., 1997-2040 for PV and 1997-2035 for wind power) we have 
estimated the number of temporary and permanent jobs that would be created both under 
the optimistic and the pessimistic scenario, by applying the model detailed in §6 of this pa-
per. As to the past subsidies, we have not considered them where reliable estimates were not 
available. This will lead to underestimating, however slightly, the total amount of subsidies 
over the considered period. Table 18 summarizes.
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Year Wind PV
Capacity Subsidies (M€)
Jobs
(Optimistic)
Jobs
(Pessimistic) Capacity
Subsidies 
(M€)
Jobs
(Optimistic)
Jobs
(Pessimistic)
2000 363.44 3539 1259 6.31 25 17
2001 663.86 7871 2801 6.58 36 21
2002 780.11 3645 1297 6.41 25 14
2003 873.64 188.70 3213 1144 7.04 0.29 51 27
2004 1131.49 234.53 7393 2631 7.12 0.10 31 20
2005 1638.96 329.07 13873 4937 7.12 0.10 28 18
2006 1908.29 382.96 8541 3040 7.17 0.12 30 19
2007 2714.13 437.56 22141 7879 86.75 0.20 3324 1272
2008 3637.58 507.07 25966 9238 431.50 110.22 14598 5633
2009 4587.58 766.58 27645 9839 750.57 300.00 14808 6076
2010 5340.88 892.46 23830 8481 1205.38 394.84 21593 8982
2011 6393.14 1062.65 32074 11415 1794.77 587.91 28822 12195
2012 7552.00 1245.68 35883 12770 2515.14 823.88 36388 15673
2013 8815.46 1445.72 39758 14149 3359.20 1100.36 44124 19347
2014 10180.36 1662.43 43669 15541 4309.93 1411.79 51599 23048
2015 11642.40 1884.71 47584 16934 5339.07 1748.90 58290 26558
2016 13196.11 2094.14 51467 18317 6405.70 2096.54 63569 29611
2017 14834.88 2348.55 55286 19676 7454.78 2439.97 66709 31891
2018 16550.92 2619.67 59005 20999 8415.69 2754.79 66869 33022
2019 18335.31 2874.75 62585 22273 9200.78 3011.81 63093 32572
2020 20200.00 3101.54 66534 23679 9500.00 3109.82 45901 26859
2021 20200.00 3056.54 22410 7976 9500.00 3109.74 34647 22901
2022 20200.00 2921.88 22410 7976 9500.00 3109.79 34647 22901
2023 20200.00 2767.58 22410 7976 9500.00 3109.58 34647 22901
2024 20200.00 2608.83 22410 7976 9500.00 3109.56 34647 22901
2025 20200.00 2482.95 22410 7976 9500.00 3109.56 34647 22901
2026 20200.00 2307.12 22410 7976 9500.00 3109.54 34647 22901
2027 20200.00 2113.48 22410 7976 9500.00 3083.47 34647 22901
2028 20200.00 1902.35 22410 7976 9500.00 2970.54 34647 22901
2029 20200.00 1674.28 22410 7976 9500.00 2866.03 34647 22901
2030 20200.00 1429.97 22410 7976 9500.00 2717.05 34647 22901
2031 20200.00 1170.35 22410 7976 9500.00 2523.98 34647 22901
2032 20200.00 896.51 22410 7976 9500.00 2288.01 34647 22901
2033 20200.00 609.76 22410 7976 9500.00 2011.52 34647 22901
2034 20200.00 311.59 22410 7976 9500.00 1700.10 34647 22901
2035 20200.00 0.00 22410 7976 9500.00 1362.98 34647 22901
2036 9500.00 1013.59 34647 22901
2037 9500.00 669.95 34647 22901
2038 9500.00 355.19 34647 22901
2039 9500.00 98.01 34647 22901
2040 9500.00 0.00 34647 22901
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Table 18. Capacity, subsidies, and jobs (1997-2040), Source: own elaboration or estimates on Terna 
(2009), GSE (2010), Italian Government (2007), AEEG (2009c). 
As it can be easily seen, our estimates tend to under evaluate the number of jobs in the early 
years of renewable investments. Alas, we don’t regard this as a major problem, especially 
because the way we have built out estimates warrants that we have overestimated jobs 
nearly anywhere else. 
Figures 14 and 15 further illustrate our scenarios (figure 14 for wind energy, figure 15 for pv).
Figure 14 Jobs (two scenarios) and subsidies to the wind power industry. 
Figure 15 Jobs (two scenarios) and subsidies to the PV power industry.
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7.2. Evaluating job creation
Having estimated all the relevant data, we can now evaluate whether the so-called “green 
deal” can be an effective strategy to create jobs. To do so, we have followed the methodol-
ogy employed by Calzada et al. (2009) of estimating the stock of capital per worker in the 
green industry with the same ratio for the industry and the economy in general. For the lat-
ter, we rely on Istat (2009b).
For the green energies, we have estimated the stock of capital per worker by summing all the 
subsidies that have been, and will be, given to the programmed capacity until the current 
subsidy schemes expires, in 2035 for wind and 2040 for PV. We assume no new capacity is 
brought onstream after 2020. According to our estimates, the entire flow of subsidies to re-
newable energy will result in the creation of some 23,700 to 45,100 jobs in the wind power 
sector, and 26,900 to 45,900 jobs in the PV sector, in 2020. We wish to emphasize that we 
deem these estimates as grossly exaggerated, since they are based on figures that, according 
to our own informal surveys, are themselves grossly exaggerated. 
In order to insure the creation of such an apparently huge number of jobs, a significant 
amount of subsidies has been given or committed. According to our estimates, the capital 
stock embodied in the renewable capacity that we have assumed will be installed by 2020, 
calculated as the sum of all the subsidies spent and committed and discounted at a 4% rate, is 
as much as 30,800 million euro for the wind power and 32,700 million euro for the PV in pure 
subsidies. Notably, the aggregate amount of subsidies devoted to the wind power is approxi-
mately as much as the amount we estimate for PV, but the installed wind capacity in 2020 
would be more than twice as much as PV capacity, and the production will be nearly seven 
times higher (we estimate 29,500 GWh versus less than 4,300 GWh). 
Under these figures, we find that the average stock of capital per worker in the wind power 
sector is 464,000 to 1,304,000 euro, depending on the scenario. The same figure for the PV is 
713,000 to 1,220,000 euro approximately. From Istat (2009b) we know that the average stock 
of capital per worker in the industry, over 2005-2008, has been 112,500 euro, while the same 
figure for the whole economy is 163,200. Table 19 and 20 summarizes the ratios we found.
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Wind Optimistic Scenario Pessimistic Scenario Average
Stock of capital per  worker  in the 
industry (€) [Si]
112,525
Stock of capital per  worker  in the 
entire economy (€) [Se]
163,250
Stock of capital per worker (€) [S] 464,010 1,303,801 684,436
S / Si 4.12 11.6 6.1
S/Se 2.8 8.0 4.2
Table 19. Average stock of capital per worker and ratios in the wind power industry. Source: Istat 
(2009b); own estimates.
PV Optimistic Scenario Pessimistic Scenario Average
Stock of capital per worker in the 
industry (€) [Si]
112,525
Stock of capital per worker in the 
entire economy (€) [Se]
163,250
Stock of capital per worker (€) [S] 713,755 1,219,762 900,547
S / Si 6.3 10.8 8.0
S/Se 4.4 7.5 5.5
Table 20. Average stock of capital per worker and ratios in the PV power industry. Source: Istat 
(2009b); own estimates.
According to our estimates, the total stock of capital embodied in the renewable capacity to 
be installed by 2020 is as much as over 63.6 billion euro, that will take to the creation of 
50,500 to 112,400 jobs in 2020, according to the scenario, with an average of 81,500 jobs. 
The stock of capital per worker would range between 556,000 euro to 1,259,000 euro, with an 
average of 781,000 euro. This would stand in a ratio between 5.0 and 11.2, with an average 
of 6.9, with the average stock of capital in the industry; and a ratio of 3.5 to 7.7, with an av-
erage of 4.8, with the average stock of capital in the whole economy. 
Figure 16 below summarizes with respect to the industry, that—for the reasons detailed above 
—we deem as the correct benchmark.
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Figure 16. Average stock of capital per worker in the RES with respect with the average stock of 
capital in the industry.
That means that, on average, one extra green job is equivalent to 6.9 jobs in the industry, or 
4.8 jobs in the whole economy. That suggests that investing in RES is not an effective strategy 
to create jobs.
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8. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have reviewed the available evidence on green jobs, finding that no conclu-
sive evidence is possible regarding the net effect of green subsidies on total employment. Ac-
cording to the existing literature, though, the net occupational effect of green subsidies may 
be positive insofar a country is a technology-producer and –exporter. Italy is neither, which 
leaves room for a presumption of a negative net impact on employment. Moreover, some 
studies—most notably Calzada et al. (2009)—find that the net occupational effect may be 
negative in Spain, which is a technology-producer and –exporter.
In order to assess the situation in Italy, we have first of all estimated the amount of subsidies 
that have been spent or  committed on renewables. To do so we have assumed the country 
will meet its 2020 “maximum potential” for wind and PV power, as calculated by the Italian 
Government (2007). This is likely to be an overestimate, leading to overestimating the num-
ber jobs that will be created. Then, we have reviewed the existing estimates on the actual 
number of green jobs. Even though we feel like virtually all these studies overestimate the 
number of green jobs, we have taken them as a given, in order to use them as a basis for our 
projection of job creation by 2020. With these data, we have been able to estimate the total 
stock of capital embodied in the wind and PV capacity that will be on field in 2020, and hence 
to estimate the average stock of capital per worker.
Finally, we have compared the average stock of capital per worker in the RES with the aver-
age stock of capital per worker in the industry and the entire economy, finding an average 
ratio of 6.9 and 4.8, respectively. To put it otherwise, the same amount of capital that cre-
ates one job in the green sector, would create 6.9 or 4.8 if invested in the industry or the 
economy in general, respectively,—although differences exist between RES themselves, with 
wind power more likely to create jobs than PV power. This fact is particularly relevant be-
cause we didn’t even consider the non-trivial value of the renewable energy produced, but 
we focused on pure subsidies. If we had considered the energy value, the average stock of 
capital per worker would result even higher. Since subsidies are forcibly taken away from the 
economic cycle, and allocated for political purposes, it  is especially important to have a clear 
vision of what consequences they beg. 
This does not necessarily mean that the creation of one green job would destroy 7 jobs in the 
industry. This just suggests what is obvious by anecdotal and financial evidence, i.e. that the 
green industry is a capital-intensive, not a labor-intensive industry. It is no surprise, there-
fore, that green investments generate less jobs than investments in other sectors of the 
economy, and most notably the industrial sector. This does not even necessarily mean that the 
green economy is a net loss of resources, although there is some evidence even for this. 
The only scope, and we dare to say the only result, of our study is to show that green invest-
ments are an ineffective policy for job creation. Regardless to their other merits, that we 
have not reviewed in this paper, to the extent that the “green deal” is aimed at creating em-
ployment or purported as anti-crisis or stimulus policy, it is a wrong policy choice.
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